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THE IMPACT OF RISK AVERSION  
ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN PORTUGAL
Erin Lindsey Burton
Introduction
 Risk aversion can be described as an in-
dividual’s attitude toward taking risks. High-
ly risk-averse individuals tend to make more 
conservative decisions than less risk-averse 
individuals. Risk aversion becomes an import-
ant factor when considering life decisions, es-
pecially for economic and financial decision 
making. Variability in the degree of risk aver-
sion occurs because people have different per-
ceptions of risk as a result of various cultural 
values. Because individuals with similar cul-
tural norms and views are most likely clustered 
within a country, risk aversion at the national 
level can be viewed as a cultural trait (Lehnert 
et al., p. 12).
 In this article, I first show that there is a 
high level of risk aversion in Portugal relative 
to that in other countries. I attribute this high 
degree of risk aversion to the country’s history 
of strict societal controls and limited freedom 
of expression during the Salazar regime, and 
I suggest that this highly risk-averse behavior 
continues in society today as a result of the lin-
gering mindsets instilled by the dictatorship. 
Next, I argue that Portugal’s risk-averse culture 
induced by the dictatorship hinders econom-
ic development in the country today. In order 
to test this hypothesis, I analyze the effects of 
risk aversion on economic development for a 
large sample of countries (including Portugal). 
I use Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) in-
dex and the ratio of research and development 
(R&D) expenditures to GDP (hereafter, R&D 
expenditures to GDP) to quantify risk aversion 
in Portugal and 58 other countries around the 
world. To measure economic development, I use 
GDP per capita and stock market capitalization. 
 Regression analysis using a large sample 
of countries between 1960 and 2011 shows that 
risk-averse behavior has a significant negative 
impact on economic development. For Portu-
gal, the results imply that risk-averse behavior 
leads to a loss in stock market capitalization of 
between 3% and 15% as well as a loss in GDP 
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per capita ranging between 2% and 13%. I 
consider the implications of these findings in 
terms of the consequences of risk aversion in 
Portugal and suggest potential methods to re-
verse the negative effects of risk aversion in the 
country.
Background on Risk Aversion in Portugal
 During the years 1933–1968, Portugal’s 
government was under the dictatorial control 
of António Salazar. The Salazar regime sought 
to avoid modernization and to preserve the tra-
ditional aspects of the economy, society, and 
state. This was accomplished through the es-
tablishment of societal norms and regulations 
in line with Salazar’s strictly orthodox beliefs. 
For example, with the arrival of the New State1, 
school curricula changed and textbooks were 
rewritten to reflect Salazar’s Catholicism and 
nationalistic and authoritarian views (Opello, 
p. 70). By changing educational tools to reflect 
his own beliefs, Salazar conditioned society to 
comply with his ideologies. The presence of the 
International Police for the Security of State, 
or secret police, and strict censorship of press, 
books, and public meetings limited society’s 
freedom of expression and suppressed orga-
nized opposition (Bruce, p. 44). By banning op-
position to set societal norms and threatening 
those who disobeyed, Salazar significantly re-
duced individual initiative and generated a fear 
of nonconformity in the population. Disabling 
public involvement in both political and socie-
tal reforms gave Salazar complete control over 
almost every aspect of Portuguese life. These 
extreme controls contributed to a high degree 
of risk aversion in Portugal during the time of 
the regime.
 In addition to rigid policy limiting free-
dom of expression, the social hierarchy en-
forced during the dictatorship may have also 
contributed to the decline of individual initia-
tive and the development of risk-averse atti-
tudes. Salazar created a structure in society in 
which there was no vertical mobility between 
social classes. Essentially, Portugal was divid-
ed into two main social classes, allocating the 
majority of Portuguese citizens to the bottom 
of the pyramid, while priests, monarchists, and 
soldiers were incorporated into the elite class 
(Birmingham, p. 161). Given that there was 
virtually no possibility of climbing the social 
ladder, there was little motivation for individu-
al development and progression within society. 
Salazar instilled the mindset that where one is 
within society is where one will stay, and this 
mindset defines risk-averse individuals. 
 The rigid social structure created by Sala-
zar demobilized individuals within the social 
hierarchy by preventing movement between 
social classes, whereas the prioritization of 
family also contributed to demobilization by 
reducing individual incentive to move out of 
Portugal. The constitution of the New State 
identified the family as the primary organiza-
tional unit of society (Opello, p. 66). A study by 
Alesina and colleagues suggests that prioritiz-
ing family can enhance the strength of family 
ties and create an environment in which life 
changes are seen as risky and undesirable (Ale-
sina et al., pp. 37–38). Because of the strong 
family ties encouraged by the regime, Portu-
guese society became more demobilized and 
risk averse over the period of the dictatorship. 
Along these lines, the research of Alesina and 
colleagues indicates that countries with strong 
family ties tend to implement more stringent 
labor market regulations because individuals 
within these countries value staying close to 
family. During the regime, it is likely that peo-
ple preferred the comfort of certainty and se-
curity they found within Portugal as a result of 
Salazar’s highly regulated environment, which 
exemplifies the risk-averse culture. 
 In addition to limiting society’s freedom 
of expression, individual initiative, and mobil-
ity, Salazar isolated Portugal from the modern 
world by controlling the level of industrializa-
tion and reducing foreign influence as much 
as possible (Bruneau, pp. 19–20). To regulate 
industrialization in Portugal, Salazar imple-
mented the Industry Control Act. This law 
prohibited the construction of new factories, 
the start of new industries, location changes of 
factories, and the extension of existing facto-
ries without government permission (Deutsch, 
p. 57). These strict controls over industrial-
ization restricted individual entrepreneurial 
spirit, thus inhibiting the development of new 
industries in the country. The entrepreneurial 
 1The term “New State” was used to define Portugal 
during Salazar’s dictatorship.
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mentality is a characteristic of risk-seeking in-
dividuals. Therefore, restricting this mentality 
fosters risk-averse attitudes. In addition, Sala-
zar reduced foreign influence in Portugal by 
discouraging foreign investment and shifting 
to a more inward-oriented corporatist2 econo-
my to minimize external dependency (Chilcote, 
p. 230). Limiting foreign influence caused Por-
tugal to fall out of touch with outside modern-
izing economies, so the traditional aspects of 
the country persisted. Because modernization 
is risky due to the high-paced societal changes 
involved, countries that avoid modernization, 
like Portugal, can be described as risk averse. 
This rejection of modernity during the regime 
deterred Portugal’s development. 
 Overall, historical evidence suggests that 
the lives of Portuguese citizens were highly 
restricted during Salazar’s dictatorship. By 
limiting society’s freedom of expression, indi-
vidual initiative, mobility, and modernization, 
the regime effectively altered Portuguese risk 
perception, generating a highly risk-averse so-
ciety. It is likely that the risk-averse attitudes 
developed during the dictatorship remain in 
Portuguese society today. In the following sec-
tion, I discuss the current attitudes toward risk 
in Portugal.
Are the Portuguese Highly Risk Averse?
 Because of what took place during the 
Salazar regime, it is highly likely that Portu-
guese society still fosters risk-averse attitudes. 
With modernization discouraged and passivity 
enforced on the population, there was little 
room for change and innovation during Sala-
zar’s dictatorship. The Salazar regime was also 
a long-lasting dictatorship, surviving for al-
most four decades. Because the regime ruled 
over an extensive time period, Portuguese 
citizens became accustomed to rigid societal 
structure and limited individual expression in 
society. Therefore, Salazar’s impact on societal 
structure and behavior lingered in Portugal 
even after his death in 1968. Because it is likely 
that society feared change from Salazar’s high-
ly controlled environment, rigid regulations 
continue to persist in present-day Portugal. 
For example, current employment protection 
legislation3 and product market regulations4 in 
Portugal are highly restrictive in comparison 
to other Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) countries 
(OECD 2014, pp. 16–23). Additionally, indi-
vidual expression, nonconformist ideas, and 
entrepreneurial spirit in Portugal remain hin-
dered. To verify the persistence of risk-averse 
behavior in present-day Portugal, the level of 
risk aversion is quantified in later sections.
 The Salazar regime had largely influenced 
Portuguese risk perception. There is strong ev-
idence that the long-lasting dictatorship ren-
dered a risk-averse society, which continues to 
define Portugal today. In the following section, 
I consider the impact that this lingering risk-
averse behavior has on economic development 
in the country.
Linking Risk Aversion and Economic 
Development
 Risk aversion has a strong influence over 
consumer, corporate, and government decision 
making, which in turn can have a large impact 
on an economy. In terms of consumer decision 
making, a consumer’s intention to purchase is 
reduced by perceived risk (Kim et al., p. 556). 
Research has shown that risk-averse consum-
ers are less likely to purchase new products 
and unfamiliar products or brands (Bao et al., 
p. 739). In terms of corporate decision making, 
studies have indicated that more risk-averse 
CEOs engage in less takeover activity, because 
takeovers are a risk to a firm’s equity (Lehnert 
et al., pp. 24–25). In terms of government de-
cision making, more risk-averse countries 
tend to implement stricter regulatory policies 
 2Corporatism is the socio-political organization of a 
society into major groups with common interests. Portugal 
was a corporatist economy during the time of the regime, as 
demonstrated by Salazar’s highly organized social structure.
 3Employment protection legislation includes regula-
tions dealing with hiring policies, firing policies, wages, and 
benefits. Specifically for Portugal, employment protection 
for permanent workers is higher than the OECD average 
(OECD 2014, p. 23).
 4Product market regulation includes all policies pro-
moting or inhibiting competition between firms or products 
in the marketplace, such as entry and conduct regulations, 
administrative burdens, and price controls. Specifically for 
Portugal, professional services and transport sectors have 
product market regulations in place that are highly restric-
tive compared with the OECD average (OECD 2014, p. 16).
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(Hofstede, p. 45). Because of the strong influ-
ence risk aversion has over consumer, corpo-
rate, and government decision making, it is 
likely that risk aversion has a negative impact 
on economic development.
 When examining the effects of risk aversion 
on economic development, I consider entrepre-
neurial risk taking as a significant factor contrib-
uting to the prosperity of nations. Entrepreneur-
ial risk taking is considered an important element 
of economic development because it increases 
job opportunities, introduces new goods and ser-
vices to the marketplace, and increases national 
competitiveness (Zahra, pp. 37–38). Character-
istics such as willingness to take risks, motiva-
tion, open-mindedness, and ability to innovate 
are essential to entrepreneurship (Berger, p. 6). 
Studies have shown that risk-taking attitudes and 
entrepreneurial spirit are associated with gener-
ating economic development and increasing firm 
productivity through adoption of new technol-
ogies (Cullen et al., pp. 1501–02). This research 
suggests that promoting more risky behavior in 
Portugal may help stimulate sustainable develop-
ment in the country. 
 In addition, strict regulations in society 
have been shown to limit economic development 
capabilities. Risk-averse societies usually try to 
minimize uncertainty through strict laws and a 
high degree of regulation (Kailani and Kumar, 
pp. 82–83). One study indicates that stringent 
regulation of product and labor markets has 
adverse effects on economic growth (Koedijk et 
al., pp. 449–51). As described previously, Portu-
gal’s highly regulated economy is reflected in the 
country’s strict employment protection legisla-
tion and product market regulation. 
 The hypothesis I test in this article is that 
risk aversion has a negative impact on economic 
development. To test my hypothesis, I use com-
mon indicators of economic development and 
risk aversion, and I evaluate the effects of risk 
aversion on economic development using regres-
sion analysis. Data were collected for a sample of 
59 countries between 1960 and 2011. All coun-
tries with available World Bank data were select-
ed for this study. The 59 countries and respective 
time periods are listed in Appendix A. Additional-
ly, all risk aversion, economic development, and 
regression control variables used in this study are 
defined in Appendix B and are explained in detail 
in the following section.
Variables Used in Regression Analysis
 Risk Aversion
 I use two common measures of risk aver-
sion to test my hypothesis: Hofstede’s UA index 
and R&D expenditures to GDP. Hofstede’s UA 
measure is one of six cultural dimensions de-
fined by Hofstede and colleagues (2010). The 
cultural scales were developed from a mea-
sure of attitudes held by 88,000 employees in 
66 overseas subsidiaries of IBM (Shane, p. 56). 
Hofstede’s cultural value measures have been 
subject to more checks of validity than any 
other cultural value measure, and replication 
studies performed have confirmed Hofstede’s 
original findings (Shane p. 56). Hofstede’s UA 
measure is closely related to risk aversion; it 
measures the degree to which members of a 
society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty 
and ambiguity. A strong UA score relates to 
strict regulations in society and intolerance of 
ideas outside of societal norms, whereas weak 
scores reflect a more relaxed attitude and less 
structure (Hofstede, p. 45). Shane (p. 53) ar-
gues that people in uncertainty-accepting so-
cieties find it easier to be nonconformist and 
are more willing to take risks. Furthermore, in 
uncertainty-avoiding societies, people follow 
organizational norms and procedures (Schnei-
der, p. 10) and find it difficult to take initiative 
on their own ideas (Hofstede and Bond, p. 11). 
UA scores range between 0 and 100, with lower 
values suggesting less risk-averse behavior.
 Portugal’s UA score of 99 out of 100 is 
approximately 50% greater than the overall 
average score of 67, which suggests Portugal 
is highly risk averse. Descriptive statistics for 
all risk aversion, economic development, and 
control variables are summarized below in Ta-
ble 1. Portugal’s high level of UA reflects the 
stringent economic regulations that define the 
country. Both employment protection legisla-
tion and product market regulation are tightly 
controlled in Portugal in comparison to the 
U.K. (Boeri et al., p. 341). With Portugal’s score 
almost triple the U.K.’s score of 35, it follows 
that a high UA score reflects more rigid laws 
and regulations and constitutes highly risk-
averse behavior in a country. 
 In addition to the UA index, I use R&D 
expenditures to GDP to measure risk aversion. 
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R&D expenditures are higher-risk investments 
compared to capital expenditures on proper-
ty, plant, and equipment (Coles et al., p. 436). 
Companies investing more in R&D are con-
sidered less risk  averse. Portuguese R&D in-
vestment is low in comparison to the sample 
averages. The calculations presented are based 
on 736 observations collected for R&D expen-
diture data between 1960 and 2011. Portugal’s 
R&D expenditures to GDP averaged 0.96% 
compared with 1.24% for the overall sample, 
making the overall sample average 30% greater 
than Portugal’s average. To put this into con-
text, the U.K.’s average R&D expenditure is 
1.76% of GDP, which is almost double that of 
Portugal. This relatively low value for Portu-
gal’s R&D expenditure suggests the presence of 
risk-averse behavior in the country. 
 Economic Development
 The ratio of stock market capitalization 
to GDP (hereafter, stock market capitalization 
to GDP) and GDP per capita in current U.S. 
dollars are commonly used indicators of eco-
nomic development, and, therefore, serve as 
economic development indicators in this study. 
Stock market capitalization to GDP has been 
shown to have a positive impact on economic 
growth and development (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, pp. 225–31), and GDP per capita dis-
plays a similar relationship (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, p. 2122).
 Economic development data for Portugal 
reveal a relatively weak economy compared 
with the overall means for both stock market 
capitalization and GDP per capita. Stock mar-
ket capitalization for Portugal averaged ap-
proximately 30% of GDP compared with the 
overall sample average of 50%. In addition, 
GDP per capita for Portugal averaged $7,400, 
whereas the overall sample average is approxi-
mately $9,600.
 Controls
 I also include a number of control vari-
ables in the analysis. These control variables re-
duce the possibility that factors other than risk 
aversion may explain why risk-averse countries 
may be less developed. My control variables in-
clude the natural logarithm of GDP, the ratio of 
bank deposits to GDP (hereafter, bank deposits 
to GDP), and the ratio of exports of goods and 
services to GDP (hereafter, exports to GDP). 
The natural logarithm of GDP has been used 
in previous studies to control for the size of 
the country (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., p. 257). 
Bank deposits to GDP controls for the overall 
size of the banking sector (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, p. 6). Finally, I use exports to GDP 
to control for the degree of capital and current 
Source: World Bank; Hofstede et al. (2010) (see Appendix B).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Portugal and the Overall Sample for 1960–2011 
Portugal Overall
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD
Hofstede’s UA Index 52 99.00 0.00 3,068 66.93 22.35
R&D expenditures to GDP (%) 16 0.96 0.39 736 1.24 0.90
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 23 30.49 14.24 1,167 50.78 49.31
GDP per capita (current U.S. $) 52 7,410.82 7,215.65 2,641 9,597.80 13,749.03
Natural logarithm of GDP (current U.S. $) 52 24.34 1.38 2,654 24.87 1.90
Bank deposits to GDP (%) 51 80.07 17.08 2,234 51.44 42.40
Exports to GDP (%) 52 24.26 5.44 2,612 34.73 29.84
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account openness, which has been shown to 
have a positive effect on financial development 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., p. 257). 
Summary of Regression Results
 I estimate four regressions to measure 
the relationship between economic develop-
ment and risk aversion (Table 2). More specif-
ically, I analyze the effects of Hofstede’s UA on 
stock market capitalization and the effects of 
R&D expenditures on stock market capitaliza-
tion (Model 1 and Model 2, respectively). In ad-
dition, I evaluate the effects of Hofstede’s UA on 
GDP per capita and the effects of R&D expen-
ditures on GDP per capita (Model 3 and Mod-
el 4, respectively). As discussed previously, all 
models include controls for size of the coun-
try, size of the banking sector, and openness 
of the economy using the natural logarithm of 
GDP, bank deposits to GDP, and exports to GDP, 
respectively.
 Overall, the results from the regression 
analysis indicate that risk aversion significantly 
hurts economic development. Results suggest 
that higher levels of risk aversion in a country 
correspond to lower economic development. 
The results from the regression analysis are 
summarized in Table 2.
 The results from the regression analysis 
for stock market capitalization as a percentage 
of GDP and Hofstede’s UA measure indicate an 
inverse relationship between stock market cap-
italization and UA (Model 1). Because a greater 
UA value indicates highly risk-averse behavior, 
results demonstrate that a high level of risk 
aversion is associated with lower market cap-
italization. Similarly, I find a positive relation-
ship between stock market capitalization and 
R&D spending (Model 2). Because low values of 
R&D spending are associated with risk-averse 
behavior, these results again suggest that a 
high level of risk aversion is associated with 
lower market capitalization.
 The results from the regression analysis 
for GDP per capita and Hofstede’s UA measure 
indicate a significant negative relationship be-
tween GDP per capita and UA (Model 3). Thus, 
high UA values are associated with low GDP 
per capita. Similarly, the results from the re-
gression analysis for GDP per capita and R&D 
spending as a percent of GDP suggest a positive 
relationship between GDP per capita and R&D 
spending (Model 4). Thus, highly risk-averse 
behavior is associated with low GDP per capita.
 Using these results, I determine how 
much stock market capitalization and GDP per 
capita would change if UA fell by 10% (i.e., a 
10% change from the mean value for Portu-
gal) and if R&D expenditures increase by 10% 
(again, a 10% change from the mean value for 
Portugal). Using values from the regression 
output, I estimate that a 10% decline in UA 
would result in a 15% increase in average stock 
market capitalization and a 2% increase in av-
erage GDP per capita in Portugal.5 Similarly, 
an increase in Portugal’s average R&D expen-
diture of 10% would lead to a 3% increase in 
stock market capitalization and a 13% increase 
in GDP per capita.6 Overall, these results sug-
gest that a reduction of risk-averse behavior 
in Portugal would likely stimulate economic 
development in the country.
Prospects for Portugal
 As demonstrated in my cross-country 
analysis, risk aversion has a significant negative 
impact on economic development. Further-
more, because Portugal shows a very high level 
of risk aversion, my data indicate that reducing 
the level of risk aversion in Portugal would like-
ly improve Portugal’s economic development. 
 Recommending that the Portuguese peo-
ple should become less risk averse is imprac-
tical. Individuals vary in their degree of risk 
aversion; some choose to be highly risk averse 
and conservative in their actions whereas 
 5Using the regression coefficient of −0.47, the 10% 
decrease in UA, which is a 9.9 unit decrease, constitutes a 
4.65 percentage point increase in stock market capitaliza-
tion. This yields a 15% increase from my data average stock 
market capitalization of 30.49%. Using the regression co-
efficient of −18.20, the 10% decrease in UA constitutes a 
$180.18 increase in GDP per capita. This yields a 2% in-
crease from my data average GDP per capita of $7,410.82.
 6Using the regression coefficient of 10.27, the 10% 
increase in R&D expenditure, which is a 0.096 percentage 
point increase, constitutes a 0.99 percentage point increase 
in stock market capitalization. This yields a 3% increase 
from my data average stock market capitalization of 30.49%. 
Using the regression coefficient of 10,108.25, the 10% in-
crease in R&D expenditure constitutes a $970.39 increase 
in GDP per capita. This yields a 13% increase from my data 
average GDP per capita of $7,410.82.
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others engage in riskier behavior. Varying at-
titudes toward taking risks develop from dif-
ferences in lifestyle and cultural values. Na-
tional culture cannot change in the blink of 
an eye. Instead, national culture evolves with 
the introduction of new ideas and perspectives, 
technological discoveries and inventions, and 
integration of traditions through immigration. 
In the case of Portugal, every aspect of life 
was dictated over an extensive period of time 
through harsh repression during Salazar’s 
regime. Throughout the long-lasting regime 
with little change and innovation, Portugal’s 
cultural mindset fixated on a traditional life, as 
prescribed by Salazar. Even after the dictator-
ship, cultural values have remained largely un-
changed. However, changing this risk-averse 
culture in Portugal can occur slowly over time 
by implementing new policies that help pro-
mote risk-taking behavior in the country, as I 
describe below.
 In recent years, Portugal has undertaken 
a number of reforms to improve the economy 
and stimulate long-term growth. Although un-
intentional in design, several of these reforms 
have encouraged risk-taking behavior in soci-
ety. For example, the System of Tax Incentives 
for Company Investment in R&D now grants 
companies tax incentives if they engage in 
R&D activities. The policy was implemented to 
help improve productivity and competitiveness 
in the country (European Commission, p. 227). 
By making R&D a more attractive investment, 
companies are more willing to make risky in-
vestments.
 In addition, Portugal has set out to re-
duce labor and product market regulations. As 
stated previously, strict market regulations are 
typical in risk-averse countries. The labor mar-
ket reforms include encouraging more flexible 
working time arrangements, reducing over-
time work pay, and eliminating four public hol-
idays (OECD 2014, p. 21). As for product mar-
kets, reforms to lower barriers to firm entry 
and competition include streamlining admin-
istrative procedures for start-ups and phasing 
* Significance at α = 0.05.
** Significance at α = 0.01.
The t-statistic is presented below the coefficient in parentheses.
Source: World Bank; Hofstede et al. (2010) (see Appendix B).
Table 2
Regression Results on the Effects of Risk Aversion on Economic Development 
Stock Market Capitalization
to GDP (%)
                     GDP Per Capita  
                     (Current U.S. $)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Hofstede's UA Index –0.47** 
(–8.82)
–18.20* 
(–1.92)
R&D expenditures to 
GDP (%)
10.27** 
(5.87)
10,108.25** 
(19.07)
Natural logarithm of 
GDP (current U.S. $)
8.69** 
(11.66)
8.95** 
(9.32)
2,772.27** 
(23.69)
326.00 
(1.13)
Bank deposits to  
GDP (%)
0.37** 
(14.38)
0.18** 
(5.84)
151.98** 
(26.42)
145.05** 
(15.79)
Exports to GDP (%) 0.41** 
(9.56)
0.54** 
(12.19)
85.72** 
(10.33)
57.12** 
(4.25)
Observations 
R-squared
1,107 
0.504
688 
0.507
2,175 
0.558
695 
0.703
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out practices that discourage foreign suppliers. 
These reforms were especially prevalent in the 
electricity, gas, and retail trade sectors (OECD 
2014, p. 13). Overall, labor and product market 
reforms undertaken since 2008 to reduce re-
strictiveness have raised productivity and GDP 
levels in Portugal, and it is expected that these 
reforms will lead to a 3.5% increase in produc-
tivity and potential GDP levels by 2020 (OECD 
2014, p. 13).
 Despite the recent economic progress in 
Portugal, there is still room for improvement. 
Although R&D expenditures have increased, 
Portugal is still below the EU average in terms 
of public-private cooperation, knowledge 
transfer, and employment in knowledge-inten-
sive activities (European Commission, p. 227). 
In addition, Portugal’s above-average employ-
ment protection levels and unemployment rate 
reflect a need for more labor market reforms in 
the country. The OECD has suggested that pol-
icies aimed at further reducing market regula-
tions and promoting more entrepreneurship in 
Portugal will help improve the country’s econ-
omy (OECD 2014, pp. 14–15).
 According to the OECD’s ease of entrepre-
neurship index,7 Portugal is above the OECD 
average (OECD 2014, pp. 32–33), which is en-
couraging because entrepreneurship promotes 
risk-taking behavior. However, administrative 
burdens8 on start-ups for corporations and sole 
proprietor firms are still very high in Portugal. 
According to the World Bank, obtaining con-
struction permits in Portugal is difficult and 
gaining access to credit has worsened between 
2012 and 2013 (World Bank Group). By eas-
ing access to credit, policymakers could assist 
the process of firm creation and thus promote 
more entrepreneurial activity. 
 Additionally, Portugal might consider 
reforms to its bankruptcy procedures to help 
promote risk-taking behavior. Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in Portugal’s court systems remain 
highly inefficient due to the long and costly 
process they entail. Studies have shown that 
designing bankruptcy laws supportive of en-
trepreneurs by lowering entry and exit barriers 
helps increase entrepreneurship and economic 
development (Lee et al., p. 506). Moreover, the 
development of new firms in Portugal resulting 
from entrepreneurial incentives will generate 
jobs. As of March 2014, Portugal’s unemploy-
ment rate was 15.2%, well above the OECD av-
erage of 7.6% (OECD 2014, p. 20).
 To further encourage entrepreneurship, 
Portugal might consider creating more science 
and technology parks. Science and technology 
parks stimulate the growth of employment in 
the technological field and encourage technol-
ogy and knowledge transfer between research 
organization and companies (OECD 2011, 
p. 195). Research has indicated that science and 
technology parks help create a more innovative 
environment and encourage entrepreneurial 
activity (Marques et al., p. 535). One of Por-
tugal’s major science and technology parks is 
Taguspark, which runs an “Incubator of Ideas” 
to promote and support the spirit of entrepre-
neurship (NewVentureTools.net). More parks 
like Taguspark in Portugal will help stimulate 
economic development.
Conclusion
 Overall, Portugal has made significant 
progress toward increasing economic devel-
opment by implementing policies that boost 
productivity and encourage more risk-taking 
behavior. Extensive reforms have already been 
made to increase R&D expenditures in com-
panies and to reduce labor and product mar-
ket regulations. Despite the progress in these 
areas, there are several reforms that Portugal 
should consider to improve its economy even 
more. I have presented evidence that further 
reducing employment protection regulations, 
limiting administrative burdens, improving 
the efficiency of bankruptcy courts, and in-
creasing investment in science and technology 
will increase Portugal’s current level of eco-
nomic development. The strategies all focus on 
encouraging a greater degree of risk-taking be-
havior in the country. However, implementing 
these policies will not immediately change the 
current risk-averse culture in Portugal. Such a 
change is likely to take a long period of time.
 7The ease of entrepreneurship index evaluates the 
complexity of regulatory procedures, administrative bur-
dens on start-ups, and regulatory protection of incumbents.
 8Administrative burdens are costs incurred by busi-
nesses to meet legal regulations.
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Appendix A
Countries and Time Periods Studied
Country Years Country Years
Argentina 1962–2011 Malaysia 1960–2011
Australia 1960–2011 Malta 1970–2011
Austria 1960–2011 Mexico 1960–2011
Bangladesh 1960–2011 Morocco 1960–2011
Belgium 1960–2011 Netherlands 1960–2011
Brazil 1960–2011 New Zealand 1960–2011
Bulgaria 1980–2011 Norway 1960–2011
Canada 1960–2011 Pakistan 1960–2011
Chile 1960–2011 Peru 1960–2011
China 1960–2011 Philippines 1960–2011
Colombia 1960–2011 Poland 1985–2011
Croatia 1990–2011 Portugal 1960–2011
Czech Republic 1990–2011 Romania 1987–2011
Denmark 1960–2011 Russian Federation 1989–2011
El Salvador 1965–2011 Serbia 1997–2011
Estonia 1995–2011 Singapore 1960–2011
Finland 1960–2011 Slovak Republic 1982–2011
France 1960–2011 Slovenia 1990–2011
Germany 1970–2011 Spain 1960–2011
Greece 1960–2011 Sweden 1960–2011
Hungary 1968–2011 Switzerland 1960–2011
India 1960–2011 Thailand 1960–2011
Indonesia 1967–2011 Trinidad and Tobago 1960–2011
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1965–2011 Turkey 1960–2011
Ireland 1960–2011 United Kingdom 1960–2011
Italy 1960–2011 United States 1960–2011
Japan 1960–2011 Uruguay 1960–2011
Latvia 1987–2011 Venezuela, RB 1960–2011
Lithuania 1990–2011 Vietnam 1985–2011
Luxembourg 1960–2011
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Appendix B
Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Hofstede’s UA index The degree to which the members of a 
society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty 
and ambiguity.  Scale of 0–100.
Hofstede et al. (2010)
R&D expenditures  
to GDP (%)
Current and capital expenditures, both 
public and private, on basic research, 
applied research, and experimental 
development.
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank
Stock market  
capitalization to  
GDP (%)
The value of listed shares as a  
percentage of GDP.
Global Financial Development, 
World Bank
GDP per capita  
(current U.S. $)
GDP divided by midyear population.  
Data are in current U.S. dollars.
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank
Natural  
logarithm of GDP 
(current U.S $)
Natural logarithm of GDP in current  
U.S. dollars.
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank
Bank deposits  
to GDP (%)
Demand, time, and saving deposits in 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP.
Global Financial Development, 
World Bank
Exports to  
GDP (%)
The value of all goods and services  
provided to the rest of the world.
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank
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